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           ma responsabilité – malgré moi 1 
 
 
I. Dis-interest, Goodness and Substitution 
 
Emmanuel Lévinas is one of the few philosophers to revive the idea of disinterest in the 
twentieth century.  Disinterest has been associated with the Stoic ideal of apatheia, with 
Christian ideas of detachment, love and benevolence and with the “autonomy” of the 
aesthetic appreciation of beautiful objects.  Modern, secular ideas of disinterest flourished in 
the eighteenth century and can be defined broadly as the recognition of a public interest 
above and beyond private interests and the ability to judge impartially between self-interest 
and the interests of others.  Traditional or classical ideas of disinterest – ideas of disinterest 
after Descartes and before Nietzsche – can be characterised as an ongoing attempt to find a 
framework to mediate between the public and the private.  Hobbes, for example, tried to 
establish a disinterest based on an external sovereign public authority.  Others sought it in the 
internal authority of reason, sentiment or the imagination.  In each case, the question was 
how to limit or curtail the interests of the subject and to account for natural or socially 
constructed expressions of disinterestedness.  Most ideas of disinterest are founded on some 
kind of involuntary external or internal mechanism that exceeds the will of the subject (such 
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as a rush of disinterested sympathy for another that cannot be willed or manufactured).  
Nietzsche signalled the loss of faith in traditional ideas of disinterest when he insisted in 
Beyond Good and Evil that any “ ‘disinterested’ action is an exceedingly interesting and 
interested action.” 2  How does Lévinas revive and redefine disinterest?  And how far can his 
notion of dis-interestedness be said to transcend traditional ideas of disinterest? 
Lévinas makes passing reference in the late1940s to a “notion of disinterestedness” which 
he associates with a “freedom” and an exclusion of “bondage,” but it is not until Totality and 
Infinity (1961) that he singles out disinterest a significant concept in his philosophy. 3  In 
Totality and Infinity he redefines disinterest as an “ethical” discourse.  For Lévinas, ethics is 
a “calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the other.” 4  It is a 
responsibility for the other that precedes (and provides a foundation for) the relation to self.  
“Responsibility,” he remarks elsewhere, “is anterior to deliberation and is that to which I 
have thus been exposed and dedicated before being dedicated to myself.” 5  Lévinas’s theory 
of disinterest is founded on his characterisation of the relation between the self and the other 
as that of “a separated being in relation with an other absolutely other” [un être séparé en 
relation avec un autre absolument autre]. 6  This “non-allergic relation” signifies neither an 
opposition, a colonisation, nor a synthesis: it is a relation that overturns “formal logic,” a 
relation in which “the terms remain absolute despite the relation in which they find 
themselves.” 7  Totality cannot conceive of “an irreducible singularity,” and it is the very 
singularity of the subject that defines its responsibility for the other.  “To utter ‘ I’,” Lévinas 
writes, “means to posses a privileged place with regard to the responsibilities for which no 
one can replace me and from which no one can release me.”  Far from limiting my freedom, 
the other “calls it to responsibility and founds it.” 8 
The relationship with the other as “absolutely other” inaugurates what can be called a dis-
interest of the subject.  The gap between the prefix dis- and interest emphasises a reversal or 
removal of interest that does not originate in the subject, in the interests of the self, even in 
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the interests of the self in being disinterested.  In ‘The Trace of the Other’ (1963), Lévinas 
suggests that any radical idea of dis-interest must be based on “a movement of the same unto 
the other which never returns to the same.” 9  Hegel’s philosophy, he argues, represents “the 
logical outcome” of “an underlying allergy” in Western philosophy, in which “everything 
that is an attitude of consciousness ... is in the last analysis self-consciousness, that is, 
identity and autonomy.”  The movement of the self towards the other is in effect always an 
act of self-interest, a momentary negation, an ersatz disinterest, which ultimately propels self-
consciousness towards absolute knowledge.  Any movement of the self towards the other is 
already guaranteed a return journey “in which the other is transmuted into the same.” 10  In a 
“departure without return,” on the other hand, “the I loses its sovereign coincidence with 
itself, its identification, in which consciousness returned triumphantly to itself and rested on 
itself.” 
Dis-interest interrupts the great project of self-consciousness as the colonisation of the 
other.  The “putting into question of the self is precisely the welcome of the absolutely 
other.”  In welcoming the other, the self exposes itself to a pre-existing, unavoidable and 
infinite responsibility for the other, announcing “a surplus for which intentionality is 
inadequate.” 11  Lévinas insists in Totality and Infinity that when describing the relation 
between “a separated being” and “an other absolutely other” “as disinterested 
[désintéressée],” one should not “recognize” any “intentionality” in this disinterested 
relation. 12  Disinterest is a waking “sans intentionalité.” 13  The relationship with the 
infinitely other – especially a so-called “disinterested” relation of the self to the other as an 
act of good conscience – exceeds intentionality.  Dis-interest is malgré moi, despite myself. 
Lévinas’s redefinition of disinterest as a dis-interest links disinterestedness to goodness.  
He writes: 
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the infinite in the finite, the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea 
of Infinity, is produced as Desire – not a Desire that the possession of the 
Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the Infinite which the desirable arouses rather 
than satisfies.  A Desire perfectly disinterested – goodness [Désir parfaitement 
désintéressé – bonté]. 14 
 
In contrast to need, which is predicated on the subject’s lack or nostalgia and the attempt to 
possess and absorb the other, desire is that which “cannot be satisfied,” which looks “beyond 
everything that can simply complete it.”  Desire reflects “a relationship whose positivity 
comes from remoteness, from separation”: desire “is like goodness.”  Goodness, the Good, is 
beyond being.  “The Good [le Bien],” Lévinas suggests, “is Good in itself and not by relation 
to the need to which it is wanting; it is a luxury with respect to needs.  It is precisely in this 
that it is beyond being.” 15  The good is “better than being.” 16  Dis-interest is a form of 
goodness because it is an interest – malgré moi – in the infinite, an interest that exceeds the 
need of the same and expresses the always unfulfilled desire for the absolutely other.   
In his later works Lévinas develops the idea of dis-interest, extending it from “the 
exclusively moral sense of the term” to “an even more radical sense,” namely, “a 
disinterestedness opposed to the essence of a being.” 17  In Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence (1974), he argues that the “event of being” is “the esse, the essence.” Working “as an 
invincible persistance,” essence “is interest,” “being’s interestedness” and “interestedness” is 
“persisting in being.” 18  In contrast, disinterestedness describes “an order more grave than 
being and antecedent to being”: a fundamental and “pre-original” disengagement of 
“subjectivity from its essence.” 19 
In the dense, rich repetitions and circling eddies of Otherwise than Being, Lévinas suggets 
that “subjectivity is the other in the same.”  In other words, the subjectivity of the subject is 
only apparent, only expresses itself, when the other is “in the same.”  Dis-interestedness [dés 
-intéressement] signifies a “subjectivity that ... breaks with essence.” 20  Essence “is not only 
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conveyed, it is temporalized in a predicative statement” and therefore, time (“a diachrony 
refractory to all synchronization”) and language (a “saying” that proceeds and is betrayed by 
a “said” which, nonetheless, retains a trace of the saying) indicate a subjectivity that is 
irreducible both to self-consciousness and to intentionality. 21  In time and through language, 
subjectivity signifies “prior to essence” and “to the other.” 22 
For Lévinas, signification is a substitution and substitution is a radical dis-interest.  “In its 
being,” Lévinas writes, “ subjectivity undoes essence by substituting itself for another.”  The 
“extraordinary and everyday event of my responsibility for the faults or misfortune of others” 
rests on a fundamental “vulnerability,” a passive exposure, a giving despite oneself, a “risk of 
suffering without reason.” 23  Dis-interest is “the-one-for-the other to the point of 
substitution.” “A subject,” Lévinas insists, “is a hostage.”  The other is “the persecuted one 
for whom I am responsible to the point of being a hostage for him.” 24  As Jacques Derrida 
suggests in Adieu (1997), Lévinas evokes a hospitality that precedes ownership of one's self 
(l’hospitalité precede la propriéte).  Dés-intéressement is an original welcoming of the other 
in which the subject is both the “host” and the “hostage” of the other.  A hostage, Derrida 
notes, is “someone whose uniqueness endures the possibility of a substitution.” 25 
In Otherwise than Being Lévinas reworks the notion of “a separated being in relation with 
an other absolutely other” into the idea of an irreplaceable singularity that substitutes itself 
for the other: “the non-interchangeable par excellence, the I, the unique one, substitutes itself 
for others.”  To “be dis-interested,” is to submit to an “undeclinable” and original obligation 
to reverse interest, to interrupt essence and to divest being through a passive substitution of 
self for the other that conditions my subjectivity. 26  For Lévinas, “subjectivity is described as 
a substituting for the other, as disinterestedness.” 27 
 
 
 
 6  
II. Secrecy, Reason and Enthusiasm 
 
Lévinas’s idea of dis-interest signals a profound break with traditional projects of 
disinterest in that is not concerned with establishing a disinterested subject as much as 
insisting on a radical dis-interest of the subject.  Dis-interest should not be taken as a triumph 
of morality, as a victory of ethics that confirms a comforting plenitude of disinterest as good 
conscience.  A radical dis-interestedness, Lévinas insists, “could never mean altruistic will, 
instinct of ‘natural benevolence,’ or love.” 28  At the same time, it is apparent that Lévinas 
repeats or at least relies on certain gestures of the classical ideas of disinterest.  He redefines 
and reinhabits disinterest.  
Despite his departure from a traditional faith in the disinterested subject, Lévinas shares 
with the classical thinkers of disinterest the conviction a framework can be found to mediate 
between the public and the private.  For Lévinas, dis-interest is founded on the assumption 
that the private can be independent of the public.  In Totality and Infinity he argues, “the 
individual and the personal count and act independently of the universal, which would mould 
them.” 29  Without separation, that is, “a relationship within independence,” the individual 
would be subsumed in “an impersonal relation within a universal order.” 30  The “separated 
being in relation with an other absolutely other” is “the private individual” who resists the 
tyranny of the state and founds the pluralist society. 31  
By maintaining its “secrecy,” a separated being provides the foundation for a pluralism or 
multiplicity that, “over and beyond the totality,” “inaugurates a society.” 32  The relationship 
with the other “relates us with the third party,” “the whole of humanity,” and establishes a 
pluralist social order through “fraternity and discourse.”  Keeping in mind that “justice can be 
established only if I ... always destituted and divested of being ... can become an other like 
the others,” the recognition of the third party inaugurates justice in society. 33  As a separated 
being, the private individual in society retains a secret “inner life” that cannot be brought to 
 7  
light, made visible, in the “universal order” of the state. 34  Lévinas gives the secret an 
exemplary role in mediating between the private individual, society and the state. 35 
When he speaks of a private that is independent of the public as the foundation for a civil 
society, Lévinas evokes an idea of disinterest that emerged in the late eighteenth century.  At 
the same time, he breaks with traditional ideas of disinterest when he insists that the private 
has always already suffered a fundamental privation of its autonomy.  Separation remains “a 
relationship within independence,” “a separated being in relation with an other absolutely 
other.” 36  Lévinas may share with classical ideas of disinterest the belief that one can draw a 
clear distinction between the public and the private – a belief which distinguishes him from 
Derrida  – but dés-intéressement signals a radical break with the common assumptions about 
the origin and grounds of the private. 37  
Lévinas also differs from the customary ideas of disinterest in his refusal to rely on either 
sentiment or sovereign reason to provide an internal authority for the disinterest of the 
private.  The relationship with the other cannot be reduced to “a movement of sympathy 
merging us with him.” 38  Sympathy is seen by Lévinas as a mode of synthesis that attempts 
to domesticate, subjugate and deny the infinite alterity of the other.  While he makes a point 
of rejecting the sympathetic imagination – perhaps the most popular grounds for disinterest in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century (I involuntarily sympathise with the other by imagining 
myself in his or her situation) – Lévinas’s attitude towards reason is more complex.  He 
redefines and retains much of the traditional associations of disinterest with reason and 
rationality.   
Socrates taught, Lévinas notes in Totality and Infinity, that I “receive nothing of the Other 
but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from 
the outside.”  This apparent “primacy” and “permanence” of the same is the foundation of the 
role played by “reason” in Western philosophy.  Lévinas comments: “That reason in the last 
analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralizing the other and encompassing 
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him, can come as no surprise once it was laid down that sovereign reason knows only itself, 
that nothing other limits it.” 39  Western philosophy has characterised reason as a “universal 
thought.”  The “very being” of reason “consists in renouncing singularity” and, consequently, 
any kind of relation between a separated being and the infinitely other. 40  Lévinas goes on to 
write:  
 
Reason makes human society possible, but a society whose members would be 
only reasons would vanish as a society.  What could a being entirely rational 
speak of with another entirely rational being?  Reason has no plural; how could 
numerous reasons be distinguished? 41 
 
Rational discourse is a “monologue” always “becoming universal.” 42  Autonomous and 
sovereign, reason “opens upon” the “universal order” of an impersonal state. 43   
In spite of his condemnation of the sovereignty of reason, Lévinas gives rationality a 
significant place in his theory of dis-interest.  He redefines reason by rejecting the dominant 
notion of rationality as a “suspension of action” in which reason alone guides and affirms the 
freedom of an autonomous subject to be disinterested. 44  He substitutes for this classical idea 
of reason the notion of rational critique that begins by putting its own origin in question.  
Rationality, he argues, has an ethical place within “the critique of spontaneity engendered by 
failure.” 45  In other words, reason is a critique already haunted at the outset by its failure in 
relation to the other.  It is a critique “which calls into question the central place the I occupies 
in the world” and which poses the “problem of the foundation.” 46  In this context, Lévinas 
states: “the essence of reason consists not in securing for man a foundation and powers, but 
in calling him in question and in inviting him to justice.” 47 
Lévinas is closest to the conventional ideas of disinterest when he repeats the traditional 
opposition between rational disinterest and enthusiasm.  As Derrida observes in ‘Violence 
and Metaphysics’ (1964), Lévinas is firmly against the ecstatic ravishing of enthusiasm. 48  
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Enthusiasm for Lévinas is, in the gravest sense, irresponsibility. 49  In Totality and Infinity he 
argues, “the ethical relation ... cuts across every relation one could call mystical” and defines 
“the rational character of the ethical relation.” 50  In the earlier essay, ‘A Religion for Adults’ 
(1957), he suggests as “man’s possession by God,” enthusiasm is the antithesis of 
disinterestedness.  Enthusiasm is the source of an idolatry that denies “human freedom,” 
responsibility and any ethical relationship with the other. 51  However, as well shall see, 
Lévinas also appears to associate a certain kind of enthusiasm with dis-interest.  
The dangerous effects of enthusiasm are found also in a violence arising from the modern 
valorisation of myth.  As Derrida notes in a significant passage from ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics,’ Lévinas associates this modern “enthusiasm” with the thought of Heidegger: 
 
Despite all the misunderstandings which may be embedded in this treatment of 
Heideggerean thought ... Lévinas’s intention, in any event, seems clear.  The 
neutral thought of Being neutralizes the Other as a being ... The Heideggerean 
‘possibilities’ remains powers.  Although they are pretechnical and preobjective, 
they are nonetheless oppressive and possessive.  By another paradox, the 
philosophy of the neutral communicates with a philosophy of the site, of 
rootedness, of pagan violence, of ravishment, of enthusiasm, a philosophy offered 
up to the sacred, that is, to the anonymous divinity, the divinity without the 
Deity.52 
 
According to Lévinas, Heidegger’s thought is overshadowed by a misguided confidence in 
myth and an admiration for “pagan violence.”  “Myth,” Lévinas warns, “albeit sublime, 
introduces into the soul that troubled element, that impure element of magic and sorcery and 
that drunkenness of the sacred and of war that prolong the animal within the civilzed.” 53  
Heidegger has perpetuated the violence of the mythic by seeking some kind of transcendent 
authenticity in the primitive and pagan.  In the extraordinary essay “Heidegger, Gargarin and 
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Us” (1961), Lévinas depicts Heidegger as an enthusiast par excellence, as an advocate of the 
mythic and idolatrous pagan cults of nature opposed to technology and modernity. 54  He 
reiterates this charge in Totality and Infinity, remarking “possession is preeminently the form 
in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine.  In denouncing the sovereignty of 
the technological powers of man Heidegger exalts the pre-technological powers of 
possession.” 55  Lévinas counters this thought – and enthusiasm as possession – by redefining 
humanism as “a system of principles and disciplines that free human life from the prestige of 
myths, the discord they introduce into ideas and the cruelty they perpetuate in social 
customs.” 56 
 
III. The Dispossession of Possession 
 
Lévinas’s view of enthusiasm and its opposition to dis-interest is more complex than it 
first appears.  As a form of possession, enthusiasm is linked in Totality and Infinity to a 
number of different forms of possession and non-possession, including the possession of self, 
of home, of things, the dispossession by the other and the possession by a god.  For Lévinas, 
possession appears to be a necessary moment of egoism in the evolution of the separated 
being and its relation to world and to the infinitely other.  As he says in ‘Ethics and Spirit’ 
(1952), “every experience of the world is at the same time an experience of self, possession 
and enjoyment of self: it forms and nourishes me.” 57  However, before possession as 
dwelling in a home (before the “enjoyment of self”), the subject encounters the elements.  
The elements are “essentially non-possessable, “ ‘nobody’s’: earth, sea, light, city.”  “Every 
relation or possession,” Lévinas writes, “is situated within the non-possessable which 
envelops or contains without being able to be contained or enveloped.” 58  Formless, 
anonymous, the element presents “the strangeness of the earth,” the there is, “the nothingness 
which separates.” 59  Any form of possession is founded on an original dispossession. 
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After encountering the elemental “the non-possessable,” possession as habitation, as chez 
soi (being at home with oneself, interiority), is the essential phase of “the recollection of the I 
in its dwelling.”  The possession of a home in turn makes the possession of things possible.  
Through my labour, I seize, grasp and attempt to master things, substances, in the world: 
possession becomes a “taking-possession.” 60  It is through possessing things that the subject 
must encounter the other that resists possession:  “A thing does not resist acquisition; the 
other possessors – those whom one cannot possess – contest and therefore can sanction 
possession itself.  Thus the possession of things issues in a discourse.”  It is the other “who 
calls in question possession itself.” 61  “The other – the absolutely other – paralyses 
possession,” dispossesses possession itself. 62   
The elemental non-possessive origin of the subject’s possession of itself and the world is 
indicative of “the radical character of the uprootdeness of him who is recollected in a 
home.”63  Hospitality, the giving or offering of what is possessed, underwrites any notion of 
home, of chez soi. “The possibility for the home to open to the Other,” Lévinas writes,  “is as 
essential to the essence of the home as closed doors and windows.”  It is language – 
discourse – that “puts in common a world hitherto mine.”  Language “is a primordial 
dispossession, a first donation.” 64 Lévinas suggests that there is a necessary possession by the 
subject of itself which in turn must lead to a dispossession of the subject’s self-possession by 
the other.  Self-possession (founded on an original non-possession) is dispossessed by the 
other.  Possession is always already a dispossession: a (dis)possession. 
Without overlooking the different forms of possession and non-possession that Lévinas 
traces, there is a significant relation between enthusiasm and (dis)possession in his work.  
The link between enthusiasm and dis-interest gestures towards the most traditional idea of 
disinterest: God as original (dis)possession.  Lévinas implies that there are at least two forms 
of enthusiasm: enthusiasm as violence and enthusiasm as inspiration.  In ‘Ethics and Spirit,’ 
he argues, “violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to 
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act.”  He notes, “nearly every causality is in this sense violent: the fabrication of a thing, the 
satisfaction of a need, the desire and even the knowledge of an object.” 65  “But,” he adds, 
“violence can also lie, in large part, in the poetic delirium and enthusiasm displayed when we 
merely offer our mouths to the muse who speaks through us; in our fear and trembling when 
the Sacred wrenches us out of ourselves.”  Enthusiasm is the violence both of possessing and 
of being possessed.  The “violent man,” Lévinas goes on to say, “does not move out of 
himself.  He takes, he possesses.  Possession denies independent existence.  To have is to 
refuse to be.  Violence is a sovereignty, but also a solitude.  To endure violence in 
enthusiasm and ecstasy and delirium is to be possessed.” 66  The violent man denies the 
dispossession of possession. 
In Totality and Infinity Lévinas implies that possession by a god, enthusiasm – which he 
has previously characterised as a loss of freedom and denial of responsibility – can also lead 
to a dispossession of the solitude of self-possession and to a relationship with the other as 
infinitely other.  This enthusiasm as dispossession is also aligned to a certain rationality.  In 
the midst of discussing the “the idea of Infinity,” Lévinas quotes from Plato’s Phaedrus: 
 
We find that this presence in thought of an idea whose ideatum overflows the 
capacity of thought is given expression not only in Aristotle’s theory of the agent 
intellect, but also, very often, in Plato.  Against a thought that proceeds from him 
who “has his own head to himself,” he affirms the value of the delirium that 
comes from God, “winged thought.”  Delirium here does not have an irrationalist 
significance; it is only a “divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and 
convention.”  The fourth type of delirium is reason itself, rising to the ideas, 
thought in the highest sense. 67 
 
He goes on to say: “possession by a god, enthusiasm, is not the irrational, but the end of the 
solitary ... or inward thought, the beginning of a true experience of the new.”  Lévinas 
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suggests that there is a non-irrational enthusiasm that dispossesses the self-possession of the 
subject: a rational enthusiasm that disinterests the interests of being.  “The end of the 
solitary,” he writes,  – enthusiasm – is “already Desire.”  On the same page, he speaks of “the 
Desire for the Infinite. ... A Desire perfectly disinterested – goodness.” 68     
After Totality and Infinity, Lévinas is more explicit about this relation between enthusiasm 
and dis-interest.  In Otherwise than Being, he describes inspiration as “the claiming of the 
same by the other.” 69  In “God and Philosophy” (1975), he associates dés-intéressement with 
a certain “inspiration” and “prophetic testimony.” 70  The proximity, the (im)possible 
suggestion of a similarity in function or ends of dis-interestedness and enthusiasm raises the 
most difficult questions about a dis-possession or dis-interest of the subject.  Whom or what 
can counter “the ecstasy of intentionality”? 71  What is the difference between the possession 
of and being dispossessed by the self, by the other – and the most difficult question of all – by 
God? 72  Whom or what sanctions or can sanction this difference? 
 
IV. Dis-interest, God and Judaism 
 
If you have a sapling in your hand and are told, “Look the Messiah is here,” you 
should first plant the sapling and then go out to welcome the Messiah. 
Johanan ben Zakkai 73 
 
Lévinas associates dis-interest with carefully redefined ideas of freedom, responsibility, 
subjectivity, reason, and inspiration.  It is this link between disinterest and inspiration that 
distinguishes him most profoundly from Derrida.  If Derrida can be said to have a theory of 
disinterest, it is unambiguously secular.  For Derrida, “disinterest” arises from the 
unavoidable and agonising interest that must be taken from “the experience of the 
impossible.”  As I take an interest (in the impossible), I am taken away from myself by the 
other and for the other. 74  Lévinas argues that a radical idea of dis-interest cannot be founded 
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on either external public structures or on the interiority of an autonomous subject.  However, 
he echoes the classical gestures of disinterest when he grounds dis-interest outside of the 
subject.  If he redefines and “removes” disinterest from its traditional external guarantees in 
public structures, is it possible that dés-intéressement cannot entirely extricate itself from 
religion, that it remains a dis-interest that is inspired by “God”?  For Lévinas, “God is outside 
and is God for that very reason.”75    
One could argue that for Lévinas the possibility of a radical dis-interest relies on both the 
idea of God and an ethical and rational Judaism.  He would perhaps say that in relation to the 
question of dis-interestedness, “the idea of God” and “an ethical and rational Judaism” are 
mediated by philosophy. 76  However, one could also say, as Catherine Chalier has 
persuasively argued in La trace de l’infini (2002), that Lévinas’s philosophy is permeated by 
“an ethical and rational Judaism” and by “the idea of God.” 77  The boundaries or borders 
between “God,” “Judaism” and “philosophy” in Lévinas’s thought are evidently and 
importantly distinct and they are also unavoidably porous.   
In the essays collected in Difficult Freedom (1963; 1976), Lévinas implies that it is the 
“horizontal” ethical relation between humans that indicates, announces the trace of a 
“vertical” relation to God.  God only “appears” in the ethical, in the just actions of men and 
women.  As Lévinas says: “ethics is not the corollary of the vision of God, it is that very 
vision.” 78  Ethics is “an optics of the Divine” and “no relation with God is direct or 
immediate.  The Divine can be manifested only through my neighbour.” 79  It is this 
“vertical”/ “horizontal” relation that provides the guarantee for a rational, inspired dis-
interest that resists the violence and myths of enthusiasm.       
For Lévinas, Judaism is uniquely predisposed to an ethical, rational and inspired dis-
interest.  “The ethical relation,” he writes, “will appear to Judaism as an exceptional relation” 
because it experiences “the presence of God through one’s relation to man.” 80  Judaism is 
less concerned with “preparing man … for a private meeting with God” than with “bringing 
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the divine presence to just and human effort.”  It is because the Torah and the Talmud are 
preoccupied not with “the mystery of God,” but “the human tasks of man,” that Judaism 
embraces a distinctive rationalism. 81  Rationalism, he insists, “does not menace the Jewish 
faith.” 82  Rational and ethical, Judaism is defined by its rejection of enthusiasm: 
 
For Judaism, the goal of education consists in instituting a link between man and 
the saintliness of God and in maintaining man in this relationship.  But all this 
effort … consists in understanding this saintliness of God that stands in sharp 
contrast to the numinous meaning of this term, as it appears in the primitive 
religions wherein the moderns have often wished to see the source of all religion.  
For these thinkers, man’s possession by God, enthusiasm, would be consequent 
on the saintliness or the sacred character of God, the alpha and omega of spiritual 
life.  Judaism has decharmed the world, contesting the notion that religions 
apparently evolved out of enthusiasm and the Sacred.  Judaism remains foreign to 
any offensive return of these forms of human elevation.  It denounces them as the 
essence of idolatry. 83 
 
The rejection of enthusiasm in Judaism is the affirmation of “human freedom.”  The 
transports and ecstasy of enthusiasm deny both the freedom to be responsible and institutes a 
divine order that transcends the ethical relations between men.  This freedom is hardly 
assured and always menaced by violence and myth: it remains a “difficult freedom.”84 
“Enthusiasm is, after all, possession by a god,” Lévinas remarks, and “Jews wish not to be 
possessed, but to be responsible.  Their God is the master of justice; He judges in the open 
light of reason and discourse.” 85  It is worth recalling that Lévinas’s earliest references to 
disinterest associate it with a certain freedom and, like this “difficult freedom,” dis-interest is 
rational, ethical, opposed to the injustices of enthusiasm and inspired by a God that “is 
outside.” 
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In “God and Philosophy,” Lévinas asks, “if God may be expressed in a reasonable 
discourse that will be neither ontology nor faith.” 86  While he is concerned not with a God 
that “is outside” as much as “the idea of God … or God in us” as the “idea of the Infinite, 
[the] Infinite in me,” he raises the question of the dis-interest of the subject by God. 87  The 
Cartesian notion of the idea of the Infinite in me is indicative of an inaugural trauma: “the 
putting in us [la mise en nous] of an unencompassable idea.” 88  How, Lévinas asks, is one to 
respond to “the monstrosity of the Infinite put in me” [mis en moi]?  How is one to respond 
to the ordeal of the Infinite transcending the subject? 89  Lévinas responds to these questions 
by returning to his original account of disinterest as desire in Totality and Infinity.  The 
Infinite “put in me” announces “a passivity more passive than all passivity” and the 
recognition of a “Desire beyond satisfaction,” a “Desire without end, beyond Being: dés-
intéressement, transcendance – desire for the Good.” 90   It is through “the idea of God” or the 
Infinite in me that the subject acknowledges – and endures – dis-interest.  Lévinas goes on to 
say that the possibility of disinterestedness “in the Desire of the Infinite” rests on the 
separation of “the Desirable or God … in the Desire.”  For dis-interest to be possible, the 
“Desirable or God” must remain separate: “Holy” [Saint]. 91  As he suggests in his 
remarkable final lectures at the Sorbonne, God, Death and Time (1975-1976), “dis-inter-
estedness” provides “the basis” for seeking “a mode of access to a non-ontological notion of 
God.”  Dés-intér-essement becomes “the passage to being’s beyond,” “the ascension toward 
God.” 92 
For Lévinas, the dis-interest of the subject by “the idea of God” describes the trauma of 
“transcendence,” of “the ‘more’ that devastates and awakens the ‘less’.” 93  Transcendence is 
dis-interest as desire: it leaves us hungry, unsatisfied – hungry for the other, starving on 
behalf of the other.  Lévinas’s theory of disinterest may reinhabit the older discourses that 
sought an “outside,” an “infinite” as the unassailable guarantee for disinterest, but he does 
not evoke the comforts and satisfactions of a disinterest founded on theology.  As Derrida has 
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suggested, Lévinas’s work perhaps repeats “without religion, the possibility of religion.” 94  
At the same time, Lévinas implies that an ethical, rational, inspired and non-enthusiastic 
disinterest is most “at home” in Judaism.  Is, according to Lévinas, a Christian (or Muslim) 
dis-interestedness possible?  Derrida has touched on this difficult and complex question in 
Adieu. 95  In a number of works, Lévinas clearly associates Christianity not with dis-interest, 
but with a lack of interest, with indifference.  In an essay from 1950 he refers to the political 
and social  “failure” of Christianity to prevent the Shoah. 96  In “The State of Caesar and the 
State of David” (1971), he identifies a “political spirit of indifference” in Christianity arising 
from the separation of the “kingdom of God and the earthly kingdom” that implicitly 
distinguishes Christianity from the terrestrial concerns of Judaism for justice and the 
universal ethical imperatives that it recognises. 97   
 
V. An Extreme Gravity 
 
Lévinas’s revival of an idea of disinterest remains weighed down by “an extreme gravity.” 
In Otherwise than Being, he asks, “Does not disinterestedness, without compensation, 
without eternal life, without the pleasingness of happiness, complete gratuity, indicate an 
extreme gravity”? 98  Dis-interest inspires a “desire for the Good,” but it is also a matter of an 
inescapable, infinite responsibility, a harsh substitution.  One can never lightly or blithely 
celebrate such a dis-interest.  As much of his work, Lévinas’s theory of disinterest is marked 
by “the acute experience of the human in the twentieth century.”  At the beginning of Totality 
and Infinity he writes: 
 
Freedom consists in knowing that freedom is in peril.  But to know or to be 
conscious is to have time to avoid and forestall the instant of inhumanity.  It is 
this perpetual postponing of the hour of treason – infinitesimal difference 
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between man and non-man – that implies the disinterestedness of goodness [le 
désintéressement de la bonté], the desire of the absolutely other or nobility. 99  
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